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ARGUMENT
Canyon Cove provides a variety of attacks on Broderick's argument that the
exculpatory provision is void as against public policy. Canyon Cove maintains that clear,
unambiguous, exculpatory provisions are enforceable. This is not in dispute. However,
much of their brief avoids discussing or analyzing the viability of exculpatory clauses in
light of public policy concerns. Rather, Canyon Cove accuses Broderick of presenting
"red herrings" and attempting to play on "sympathy." If Broderick et. al were truly
interested in making an irrelevant emotional play for sympathy, they would have detailed
the death of Ms. Byrd, a tenant and victim of Canyon Cove's negligence. (R. 3270).
Rather, Broderick focused on facts showing Canyon Cove's negligence and
analyzing those facts as weighed against enforcement of an exculpatory clause in
residential leases. Broderick provided the Court with legal analyses using those facts to
consider the public policy ramifications of immunizing Canyon Cove through an
exculpatory clause. Canyon Cove, by contrast, addresses only one point in the analytical
framework used to determine whether an exculpatory provision may shield them from
liability for their own negligence, namely, whether residential leases are adhesion
contracts. Ultimately, Canyon Cove cites only three legal authorities in their brief and
avoids any meaningful discussion of whether or not exculpatory clauses should, as a
matter of public policy, be allowed to immunize landlords from liability for harm to
others occasioned by the landlord's own negligence.

1

I. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS REQUIRE INVALIDATION OF
CANYON COVE'S EXCULPATORY PRO VISION.
Over 45 years ago this Court acknowledged the substantial trade-off between
enforcing a contractual exculpatory provision and the ability of such a provision to
undermine incentives to act with due care. Union Pac. R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., held that "the law does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve
himself of the basic duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of using due care for
the safety of himself and others."1 The court stated that such exculpatory provisions
"tend to encourage carelessness and would not be salutary either for the person seeking to
protect himself or for those whose safety may be hazarded by his conduct."2 Yet, Canyon
Cove suggests that this appeal seeks "a dramatic departure from long standing Utah
law."3 However, Broderick et. al. seek only to apply long standing principles to reach the
same conclusion an "increasing number"4 of other courts reach: exculpatory provisions in
residential leases are void as against public policy.

1

Union Pac. R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 259, 408 P.2d 910,
913-14(1965).
2

Id

3

(Appellee's Brief at 11).

4

Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 469-70 (Cal. 1978)(citations
omitted); see, also, Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tenn. 1992)("we
conclude that the exculpatory clause in the residential lease in this case is contrary to
public policy. In reaching this conclusion, we join a growing number of states.").
2

A. Canyon Cove Failed to Maintain Areas and Instrumentalities
Exclusively Within Their Control.
First, Canyon Cove claims that broken fire alarms, malfunctioning fire prevention
doors and a known history of fires and inadequate fire blocking, are attempts by
Broderick to introduce a 'red herring' into the case and/or garner 'sympathy' from the
Court. Canyon Cove claims that "Tenants attempt to sway the sympathy of this court by
listing issues such as prior fires on the property, problems with fire detector and the
presence of the couch."5
Contrary to Canyon Cove's assertion, these facts demonstrate negligence
sufficiently to have resulted in denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by Canyon
Cove. These facts are not cited in an attempt to 'sway sympathy.' Rather, Canyon
Cove's negligence in caring for areas under their exclusive control must be weighed
alongside the practical implications of immunizing them from liability for harm due to
that lack of care.
B. Canyon Cove's Exculpatory Clauses Offends Well-Settled Public Policy
Considerations.
Broderick's primary argument on appeal is that the exculpatory provision violates
public policy considerations and must be invalidated on that basis. Canyon Cove's only
attempt to directly address the public policy analysis involves the assertion that the lease
is not an adhesion contract.6 Whether or not the lease is an adhesion contract focuses on
5

Appellee's Brief at 6.

6

Appellee's Brief at 9-10.
3

only one of the six Tunkl factors to be considered in determining if the exculpatory clause
should be invalidated on public policy grounds. Further, consideration of the Tunkl
guidelines in finding a provision void as to public policy "is a flexible endeavor; the
activity at issue need exhibit only a sufficient number of Tunkl characteristics such that
one may be convinced of the activity's affinity to the public interest."7 Residential leases
and the provision of shelter clearly constitute a sufficient 'affinity to the public' interest to
gamer scrutiny from a public policy perspective. Accordingly, whether or not the lease is
an adhesion contract does not end the analysis.
Based on the briefing, it remains largely uncontested that five of the six Tunkl
factors are met here as follows: (1) residential leases remain a business type subject to
regulation;8 (2) the landlord/property owner provides a service of great public
importance, i.e. a basic necessity of shelter; (3) landlords/property owners generally hold
themselves out as willing to provide this service for any member of the public who seeks
it and, under fair housing regulations, cannot discriminate in any event;9 (4) because the
landlord/property owner provides the essential service of housing to those who cannot
afford a bank loan or others in need of short term housing, the landlord also holds a
significant advantage in bargaining strength; and, (6) the tenant and their property are

7

Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,116, 171 P.3d 442: 447, 590

8

See, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-801, Forcible Entry and Detainer (West 2010) el
seq., and, Utah Code Ann. § 57-22-1, Utah Fit Premises Act (West 2010) et. seq.
9

See, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601, etseq. (West 2010).
4

placed under the control of the landlord, subject to the risk of landlord carelessness in
failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition.
Under factor (5) of the analysis, landlords rent their properties using a
standardized lease agreement, written by them to meet their needs and offered to the
financially weaker party, the tenant, on a take it or leave it basis. Further, to the extent
that the single factor of 'adhesion' bears on a public policy analysis of the exculpatory
clause, most courts recognize the modern residential lease as a contract of adhesion.10
Utah authority recognizes that an adhesion contract "is defined as a contract entered into
between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a
standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and
offered to the weaker party on a 'take it or leave it basis."11
Canyon Cove's own briefing supports the fact that a residential lease is a 'take it
our leave it' proposition. "Surely, Tenants could have rented apartments at any of the
other apartment complexes in the area."12 Canyon Cove essentially admits that they offer
the lease on a take it or leave it basis while ignoring the fact that tenants would just as
surely have been presented with the same or substantially similar lease agreements at
other locations. Finally, reflecting the boiler plate nature of their lease, Canyon Cove
10

Taylor v. Leedy & Co., Inc., 412 So. 2d 763, 766 (Ala. 1982)("the modern
standard form lease is in essence an adhesion contract."); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.
2d 754, 758 (Tenn. 1992)("a residential landlord confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract.")
11

Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

12

See, Appellee's Brief at 10.
5

offers only one exemplar lease as addendum to their brief. Even if 'adhesion' were the
only factor to be considered under a public policy analysis, that factor has been
demonstrated in this case.
A complete analysis of all the Tunkl factors cements the proposition that, as a
matter of public policy, an exculpatory clause contained in a residential lease should be
found void.
C. Canyon Cove's Negligence Provided Both the Opportunity for Arson
and the Ability of the Fire to Spread Once Begun.
Finally, Canyon Cove argues that because the fire was 'caused by' an intentional
act of arson, the exculpatory clause should not be struck down as violating public policy
concerns. However, the act of arson does not eliminate liability for Canyon Cove's own
negligence and does not alter any of the factors used to evaluate the validity of the
exculpatory clause. At best, this line of argument raises an issue of comparative fault, an
issue that must be resolved by thefinderof fact.13
As noted in Broderick's opening brief, the landlord's duty is not to prevent the
crime which brings about injury or harm, but to take steps which minimize the
occurrence of the crime or the damage which results. In Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp.,
the plaintiff brought a claim for injury following a fire set by a serial arsonist. The trial
court dismissed the claim. The appellate court overturned the dismissal, finding that "[a]s
we see it, appellees and the circuit court misapprehended the nature of appellant's claim,

13

See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-817 through 820 (West 2010).
6

which was not based on a duty, if any, to prevent the arsonist from setting the fire, but
rather on a duty to maintain the Property so as to minimize the danger to its occupants
from fires that might occur."14
Broderick offered several case authorities and analysis regarding the interplay
between third party criminal acts, negligence of the landlord, and the ability to use an
exculpatory provision to shield the landlord from liability. Canyon Cove chose not to
respond to this argument or offer any authorities to the contrary.15 It remains
uncontroverted that, free of the deterrent effect of liability for negligence, landlords may
no longer take the necessary and reasonable steps to provide a safe environment. By
eliminating or reducing the incentive to act with due care, exculpatory clauses work to
the injury of tenants, their guests, firemen, police and other emergency personnel who
may be required to respond to a poorly maintained and hazardous property, a property
which provides fertile ground for crime to occur, or fires to spread more rapidly.
Accordingly, the exculpatory clause in this case offends sound notions of public health,
safety and welfare and should be invalidated.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Broderick respectfully requests that exculpatory clauses
contained within residential leases be found void as against public policy and that the
dismissal based on such exculpatory provision be reversed.
14

Rivers v. Hagner Mgrnt. Corp., 959 A.2d 110, 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).

15

"Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate briefing."
Coleman ex rel Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 17 P.3d 1122, 1124.
7
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